$\newcommand{\N}{\mathbb N}\newcommand{\paren}[1]{\left(#1\right)}\newcommand{\T}{\mathbb{T}}\newcommand{\m}{\mathfrak{m}}\newcommand{\E}{\mathbf{E}}$I can answer your first set of questions:
There is a geometric theory of blueprints. It's easiest* to work from the definition of a blueprint as a pair $B = (A,R)$ consisting of a semiring $R$ and a multiplicative subset $A \subseteq R$ which contains $0$ and $1$, and which generates all of $R$.
The theory will have a sorts $A,R$, function symbols $+, \cdot$, constant symbols $0_A,1_A, 0_R, 1_R$, and a unary function symbol $\iota$, giving the inclusion of $A$ into $R$. In addition to axioms asserting that $R$ is a semiring and that $A$ embeds monomorphically as a multiplicative submonoid of $R$ such that $\iota(0_A) = 0_R$ and $\iota(1_A) = 1_R$, we have the infinitary axiom
$$ \vdash^{x : R} (x = 0) \lor \paren{\bigvee_{n \in \N, \; \varphi \in \text{Oper}_{n+1}}\exists a_0\dotsm a_n . \varphi(\iota(a_0),\dotsc,\iota(a_n)) = x }$$
where $\text{Oper}_n$ is the set of $n$-ary semiring operations built from $0_R,1_R,+,\cdot$. This axioms states that $A$ suffices to generate all of $R$
There can be no coherent axiomatization of the theory $\T$ of blueprints. To see this, suppose that $\T$ were coherent. Then we could obtain a new coherent theory $\T\,'$ by introducing the following additional coherent axioms which require a blueprint in $\text{Set}$ to be isomorphic to $(\{0,1\} \hookrightarrow \N)$.
$$
\vdash^{a: A} \iota(a) = 0 \lor \iota(a) = 1
$$ $$
x + y = 0 \vdash^{x,y : R} x = y = 0 $$
Since any consistent finitary first-order theory with an infinite model will admit arbitrarily large models in $\text{Set}$, this is impossible.
Regarding local blueprints: The definition of local blueprints as those having a unique maximal ideal of course cannot, in its current form, be stated in geometric logic. However, we can say in $\text{Set}$ that a congruence $\sim_\m$ on a blueprint $B = (A,R)$ is the unique maximal nontrivial congruence on $B$ iff for any pair of elements $x,y \in R$, if $x \sim_\m y$ fails, then the smallest congruence $\sim$ such that $x \sim y$ is trivial. This can be stated in a conservative geometric extension of our theory of blueprints if we adjoin a binary relation symbol $\sim_m$ on $R \times R$, together with axioms stating that $\sim_m$ is a congruence, in addition to the following axiom which states that unless $x \sim_\m y$ holds, every congruence containing $(x,y)$ contains every pair of elements in $R$.
$$\vdash^{x,y,z,w:R} {x \sim_\m y \lor} \paren{\bigvee_{n \in \N} \exists a_0\dotsm a_n : A . \E(z,\iota(a_0)) \land \E(\iota(a_0), \iota(a_1)) \land \dotsi \land \E(\iota(a_n), w)}
$$ where $\E(c,d)$ denotes the sub-expression $$
\bigvee_{n \in \N, \; \varphi \in \text{Oper}_{n+2}} \exists b_0 \dotsm b_n : A. \varphi(c,b_0,\dotsc,b_n) = \varphi(d,b_0, \dotsc, b_n)
$$
*But not essential. Since the list object is a geometric construction, we could also write down a two-sorted theory which axiomatizes the behavior of an equivalence relation on the set of lists. The downside of that approach is that it would involve lots of complicated-to-state infinitary axioms.
I'm not sure if this constitutes a full answer, and a lot of it has already been said in some form by HeinrichD in the comments. Because your question is ultimately one of philosophy, I will focus mostly on history and philosophy (and a few applications); not so much the categorical or logical interpretations.
History. In functional analysis, the Gelfand representation shows that locally compact Hausdorff spaces can be thought of as commutative C*-algebras (but it's not quite an equivalence of categories). Then Grothendieck came around and reversed this philosophy: we can take any commutative ring $R$, and define a space $X$ such that functions on $X$ are by definition given by $R$.
Philosophy. So in my view, the philosophy of commutative rings is that they behave like functions on a space, with the operations on functions that we are used to (notably: multiplication and addition).
Local rings add one thing to this profile: a notion of vanishing or nonvanishing at a point of a given function (depending on whether or not it is in the maximal ideal). Perhaps we should think about this in light of the Stone–Weierstraß theorem: a 'good' notion of function should be able to separate points, and for this you need a notion of vanishing at a point. Note that for a general ring, the statement $p(x) \neq p(y)$ does not make sense, because $p(x)$ and $p(y)$ take values in the rings $\kappa(x)$ and $\kappa(y)$ respectively. However, the statement "$p$ vanishes at $x$ and not at $y$" does make sense.
Can we do with less? Yes, we can. For example, replacing commutative rings with pointed monoids (the point corresponding to $0$ in a ring) gives another geometric theory, for which some people suggestively use the word $\mathbb F_1$-schemes.
In terms of the philosophy above, we do away with addition, but we keep the notions of multiplication and of identically vanishing of functions. I think it is at this point that our geometric intuition leaves us behind, and perhaps this is the whole point of your question...
A general theory? It might be possible to abstract away what properties of local rings give us the most general setting in which one can do algebraic geometry. But it's not clear at all that there is an answer to this question, for it depends heavily on what properties you want your geometric theory to satisfy.
Perhaps the only way to get started on answering this question is by examining the many different 'generalised algebraic geometric' notions that have been defined and used, and carefully studying their properties. There are many different generalisations that people use, and I think a systematic study is neither possible nor desirable: it depends strongly on the application one has in mind.
Some examples. Here are some generalised/altered notions that people use:
- adic spaces (this includes rigid analytic geometry and perfectoid spaces): introduce a topology on the ring, and replace local rings by suitable valuation rings.
- as mentioned above: $\mathbb F_1$-schemes: replace rings by pointed monoids.
- almost ring theory: replace the category of rings by the category of almost rings (internal monoids in the category of almost modules, obtained as a quotient of the category of modules by a Serre subcategory).
- non-commutative algebraic geometry: remove the commutativity assumption.
All of these (and many more) notions are being used by people to actually prove things that are formulated extrinsically (without reference to the newly developed theory). These theories all share properties in common with the theory of schemes, but their geometric behaviour is very different each time, depending on the desired application.
Best Answer
If you know the objects of a geometric theory then you also know its morphisms because $\mathbb{T}(\mathbf 2,\mathcal E)\simeq [\mathbf 2,\mathbb{T}(\mathcal E)]$. This is Lemma 4.2.3 in Chapter B of Sketches of an Elephant. Hence, it is impossible for the two theories to have the same objects, but different morphisms as you request.