then $\forall x (\lnot R(x) \to P(x))$ is true where the domains of all quantifiers is the same.
I'm getting caught up on step 7 below.
- $\forall x (P(x) \lor Q(x)$ (Premise)
- $P(c) \lor Q(c)$ (Universal Instantiation from 1)
- $\forall x (\lnot P(x) \land Q(x) \to R(x)$ (Premise)
- $\lnot P(c) \land Q(c) \to R(c)$ (Universal Instantiation from 2)
- $\lnot(\lnot P(c) \land Q(c)) \lor R(c)$ (Conditional Logical Equivalence)
- $P(c) \lor \lnot Q(c) \lor R(c)$ (DeMorgan's Law)
- $\lnot P(c) \lor R(c)$ (Resolution 2 and 6)
^^^ How can 7 be the results of the resolution of 2 and 6? When I try and work it out I'm left with the following:
2-a. $Q(c) \lor P(c)$ (Commutative Law)
6-a. $\lnot Q(c) \lor P(c) \lor R(c)$ (Commutative Law)
7-a. $P(c) \lor P(c) \lor R(c)$ (Resolution 2 and 6)
— Continuing on can I apply the Idempotent law to 7-a?
-
$R(c) \lor P(c)$ (Idempotent and Commutative Laws)
-
$\lnot R(c) \to P(c)$ (Conditional Logical Equivalence)
-
$\forall x (\lnot R(x) \to P(x))$ Universal Generalization
QED.
Best Answer
Your reasoning in 2-a through 10 is correct.
Line 7 does not follow from 2 and 6. To see this, you can use a model theoretic approach to show that $\neg P(c) \vee R(c)$ is not a logical implication of $P(c) \vee Q(c)$ and $P(c) \vee \neg Q(c) \vee R(c)$.
For example, let \begin{equation} P(c) = T\\ Q(c) = T\\ R(c) = F. \end{equation} Then we have \begin{equation} (P(c) \vee Q(c)) = T\\ (P(c) \vee \neg Q(c) \vee R(c)) = T\\ \neg P(c) \vee R(c) = F. \end{equation} Thus, the conditional $[(P(c) \vee Q(c)) \wedge (P(c) \vee \neg Q(c) \vee R(c))] \rightarrow (\neg P(c) \vee R(c))$ is false in this model, which means that you cannot infer $\neg P(c) \vee R(c)$ from the other two propositions in a proof theoretic setting. Of course, this all presupposes that the logical system you are using is sound :).