[Math] Fermat’s ‘proof’ of his Last Theorem

number theorysoft-question

The definition of a unique factorisation domain came up in my rings lecture about a week ago, and my lecturer mentioned that Fermat's 'proof' of his Last Theorem probably relied on the (false) assumption that all subrings of $\mathbb{C}$ are unique factorisation domains. Does anyone know what this 'proof' would have looked like?

Best Answer

Unless new historical documents are discovered, we can never know for certain what Fermat had in mind when he made his famous FLT remark. Most number-theorists probably share the same opinion as Weil (quoted below), that he made an elementary mistake, e.g. thinking that results for smaller exponents would generalize. Nowadays it is known that Fermat's Last Theorem cannot be proved by certain types of descent proofs similar to the classical simple proofs known for small exponents (search for "Tate Shafarevich obstruction").

Below is Andre Weil's opinion on this matter, from his historical treatise Number Theory, p.104.

As we have observed in Chap. I, S.X, the most significant problems in Diophantus are concerned with curves of genus 0 or 1. With Fermat this turns into an almost exclusive concentration on such curves. Only on one ill-fated occasion did Fermat ever mention a curve of higher genus, and there can hardly remain any doubt that this was due to some misapprehension on his part, even though, by a curious twist of fate, his reputation in the eyes of the ignorant came to rest chiefly upon it. By this we refer of course to the incautious words "et generaliter nullam in infinitum potestatem" in his statement of "Fermat's last theorem" as it came to be vulgarly called: "No cube can be split into two cubes, nor any biquadrate into two biquadrates, nor generally any power beyond the second into two of the same kind" is what he wrote into the margin of an early section of his Diophantus (Fe.I.291, Obs.II), adding that he had discovered a truly remarkable proof for this "which this margin is too narrow to hold". How could he have guessed that he was writing for eternity? We know his proof for biquadrates (cf. above, S.X); he may well have constructed a proof for cubes, similar to the one which Euler discovered in 1753 (cf. infra, S.XVI); he frequently repeated those two statements (e.g. Fe.II.65,376,433), but never the more general one. For a brief moment perhaps, and perhaps in his younger days (cf. above, S.III), he must have deluded himself into thinking that he had the principle of a general proof; what he had in mind on that day can never be known.

Remark $ $ It is a common inaccurate hunch that shortly-stated theorems should have short proofs. However, this is easily disproved. For any formal system that has nontrivial power (e.g. Peano arithmetic) there is no recursive algorithm that decides theoremhood. Suppose that there existed a recursive bound $\rm\ L(n)\ $ on the length of proofs of a statement of length $\rm\:n.\:$ Then we could test for theoremhood simply be enumerating and testing all possible proofs of length $\rm\le L(n).\,$ Therefore there can be no such recursive bound on the length of proofs. Therefore there exist short-stated theorems with arbitrarily long proofs -- proofs so long that they are probably not amenable to human comprehension (this was observed by Goedel in his 1936 paper on speedup theorems).