Pete's excellent notes have correctly explained that there is no set containing sets of unboundedly large size in the infinite cardinalities, because from any proposed such family, we can produce a set of strictly larger size than any in that family.
This observation by itself, however, doesn't actually prove that there are uncountably many infinities. For example, Pete's argument can be carried out in the classical Zermelo set theory (known as Z, or ZC, if you add the axiom of choice), but to prove that there are uncountably many infinities requires the axiom of Replacement. In particular, it is actually consistent with ZC that there are only countably many infinities, although this is not consistent with ZFC, and this fact was the historical reason for the switch from ZC to ZFC.
The way it happened was this. Zermelo had produced sets of size $\aleph_0$, $\aleph_1,\ldots,\aleph_n,\ldots$ for each natural number $n$, and wanted to say that therefore he had produced a set of size $\aleph_\omega=\text{sup}_n\aleph_n$. Fraenkel objected that none of the Zermelo axioms actually ensured that $\{\aleph_n\mid n\in\omega\}$ forms a set, and indeed, it is now known that in the least Zermelo universe, this class does not form a set, and there are in fact only countably many infinite cardinalities in that universe; they cannot be collected together there into a single set and thereby avoid contradicting Pete's observation. One can see something like this by considering the universe $V_{\omega+\omega}$, a rank initial segment of the von Neumann hierarchy, which satisfies all the Zermelo axioms but not ZFC, and in which no set has size $\beth_\omega$.
By adding the Replacement axiom, however, the Zermelo axioms are extended to the ZFC axioms, from which one can prove that $\{\aleph_n\mid n\in\omega\}$ does indeed form a set as we want, and everything works out great. In particular, in ZFC using the Replacement axiom in the form of transfinite recursion, there are huge uncountable sets of different infinite cardinalities.
The infinities $\aleph_\alpha$, for example, are defined by transfinite recursion:
- $\aleph_0$ is the first infinite cardinality, or $\omega$.
- $\aleph_{\alpha+1}$ is the next (well-ordered) cardinal after $\aleph_\alpha$. (This exists by Hartog's theorem.)
- $\aleph_\lambda$, for limit ordinals $\lambda$, is the supremum of the $\aleph_\beta$ for $\beta\lt\lambda$.
Now, for any ordinal $\beta$, the set $\{\aleph_\alpha\mid\alpha\lt\beta\}$ exists by the axiom of Replacement, and this is a set containing $\beta$ many infinite cardinals. In particular, for any cardinal $\beta$, including uncountable cardinals, there are at least $\beta$ many infinite cardinals, and indeed, strictly more.
The cardinal $\aleph_{\omega_1}$ is the smallest cardinal having uncountably many infinite cardinals below it.
I suspect you're conflating two meanings of "finite". Some sets are finite, meaning they have only finitely many elements. An interval like $[0,1]$ is not such a set. On the other hand, $[0,1]$ has finite length, which is a quite different matter. As the other answers have explained, finite length does not imply finiteness (or even countability) in terms of the number of elements.
Best Answer
One issue with this is with the word "description"/"definition". What counts as a valid definition of a number? Consider the following: "The smallest positive integer not definable in under a million words." Is that a valid definition? If not, what goes wrong?
Suppose we run Cantor's argument on the definable reals, as follows. List all valid definitions of reals in order of length (use alphabetical order for definitions of the same length). Consider the real whose Nth digit is a 0 if the Nth digit of the Nth definable real is 1, and a 1 otherwise. Is this definable? Have I just defined it? (The issue with this is precisely the same as in my previous comment.) For more, look up the Berry paradox and Richard's paradox…
as well as Wikipedia's page on definable numbers.
Short resolution is: while we can define increasingly strong notions of definability, there is no ultimate notion of definability. If you hand me a definition system, I can create a stronger one that can define more numbers. If $D$ is a definition system, then the phrase "The smallest integer not definable in $D$ under a million words" is not a definition in $D$, but perhaps is a valid definition in a larger system $D'$. Each definition system on its own can only define countably many numbers, though.