I believe the papers, articles, posts e.t.c. that you diligently gathered, contain enough information and analysis as to where and why the two approaches differ. But being different does not mean being incompatible.
The problem with the "hybrid" is that it is a hybrid and not a synthesis, and this is why it is treated by many as a hybris, if you excuse the word-play.
Not being a synthesis, it does not attempt to combine the differences of the two approaches, and either create one unified and internally consistent approach, or keep both approaches in the scientific arsenal as complementary alternatives, in order to deal more effectively with the very complex world we try to analyze through Statistics (thankfully, this last thing is what appears to be happening with the other great civil war of the field, the frequentist-bayesian one).
The dissatisfaction with it I believe comes from the fact that it has indeed created misunderstandings in applying the statistical tools and interpreting the statistical results, mainly by scientists that are not statisticians, misunderstandings that can have possibly very serious and damaging effects (thinking about the field of medicine helps giving the issue its appropriate dramatic tone). This misapplication, is I believe, accepted widely as a fact-and in that sense, the "anti-hybrid" point of view can be considered as widespread (at least due to the consequences it had, if not for its methodological issues).
I see the evolution of the matter so far as a historical accident (but I don't have a $p$-value or a rejection region for my hypothesis), due to the unfortunate battle between the founders. Fisher and Neyman/Pearson have fought bitterly and publicly for decades over their approaches. This created the impression that here is a dichotomous matter: the one approach must be "right", and the other must be "wrong".
The hybrid emerged, I believe, out of the realization that no such easy answer existed, and that there were real-world phenomena to which the one approach is better suited than the other (see this post for such an example, according to me at least, where the Fisherian approach seems more suitable). But instead of keeping the two "separate and ready to act", they were rather superfluously patched together.
I offer a source which summarizes this "complementary alternative" approach:
Spanos, A. (1999). Probability theory and statistical inference: econometric modeling with observational data. Cambridge University Press., ch. 14, especially Section 14.5, where after presenting formally and distinctly the two approaches, the author is in a position to point to their differences clearly, and also argue that they can be seen as complementary alternatives.
Best Answer
The frequentist paradigm is a conflation of Fisher's and Neyman-Pearson's views. Only in using one approach and another interpretation do problems arise.
It should seem strange to anyone that collecting more data is problematic, as more data is more evidence. Indeed, the problem lies not in collecting more data, but in using the $p$-value to decide to do so, when it is also the measure of interest. Collecting more data based on the $p$-value is only $p$-hacking if you compute a new $p$-value.
If you have insufficient evidence to make a satisfactory conclusion about the research question, then by all means, go get more data. However, concede that you are now past the NHST stage of your research, and focus instead on quantifying the effect of interest.
An interesting note is that Bayesians do not suffer from this dilemma. Consider the following as an example: