The usual approach is to define a concept of a first order language $\mathcal{L}$. They are usually specified by the nonlogical symbols. Well-formed formulas in the language $\mathfrak{L}$ are strings of symbols of $\mathfrak{L}$ along with the logical symbols such as $($, $)$, $\wedge$, $\neg$, variables etc. You can look up in a logic textbook the inductive definition of well-formed formulas, but something like $x \wedge y$ is a well-formed formula, but $(()\neg\wedge xy \neg$ is not a well-formed formula.
A first order theory $T$ in the language $\mathfrak{L}$ is then a collection of well-formed sentences (no free variable) in the language $\mathfrak{L}$. You would then define the deduce relation $T \vdash \varphi$ to mean that there exists a proof of $\varphi$ using $T$. A proof is just a string of of sentences $\phi_1, ..., \phi_n$ such that $\phi_n = \varphi$, each $\phi_i$ is in $T$, a logical axiom of first order logic, follows from modus ponen or generalization using previous $\phi_j$, where $j < i$.
So the above is the definition of a arbitrary first order theory in an arbitrary first order language $\mathfrak{L}$. Now let $\mathfrak{L} = \{\in\}$ a first order language consisting a single binary relation. $ZFC$ is then the first order theory in the language $\mathfrak{L}$ consisting of the "eight axioms" you mentioned above. (Note that ZFC has infinitely may axioms. For example, the axiom schema of specification is actually one axiom for each formula.)
The benefit of this approach where the general definition of first order logic is developed first is that you apply this to study first order logic in general and other first order theories such that the theory of groups, rings, vector space, random graphs, etc. Also first order logic is developed in the metatheory. That is for example, a theorem of ZFC (even if it is about infinite cardinals greater than $\aleph_1$) has a finite proof in the metatheory. However, within ZFC you can formalize first order logic. Then you can consider question about whether $ZFC$ can prove it own consistency.
By taking the approach of developing first order theories in general, you also gain a certain perspective. Some people think that ZFC is something special since it can serve as a foundation for much of mathematics. Through this approach, $ZFC$ is really just another first order theory in a very simple language consisting of a single non-logical symbol. People often have a hard time grasping the idea that $ZFC$ can have different models, for instance one where the continuum hypothesis holds and one where it does not. However, almost everyone would agree that that there exists more than one model of group theory (i.e. more than one group). Sometimes it is helpful to know that results about arbitrary first order theory still apply when one is working in ZFC set theory.
As the quotations reveal, there are indeed two different notions here.
1 & 2 belong together. A formal theory $T$ is negation-complete if for any sentence of $T$'s language, either $T$ proves $\varphi$ or $T$ proves $\neg\varphi$ (in symbols, either $T \vdash \varphi$, then $T \vdash \neg\varphi$).
3 & 4 belong together. A logical system (e.g. for quantificational logic) is complete if whenever the premisses $\Gamma$ semantically entail the conclusion $\varphi$, there is a formal deduction in the system of $\varphi$ from premisses in $\Gamma$. (In symbols, if whenever $\Gamma \vDash \varphi$, then $\Gamma \vdash \varphi$.)
So quite different ideas: one is to do with how a deductive logic relates to the relevant notion of semantic entailment; the other is a purely syntactic notion. You can have negation-incomplete theories with complete logics, and negation-complete theories with incomplete logics (as well as the other two combinations).
Famously Gödel proved that essentially the Hilbert/Ackermann axiomatic version of quantificational logic is complete -- every semantically valid quantificational consequence (assuming a classical semantics) can be formally derived in that axiomatic system. Hence Gödel's completeness theorem (about a system of logic).
Famously Gödel proved that essentially a cut-down version of Principia's formal theory is not negation-complete: there are sentences which can't be decided one way or the other by the axioms. And the proof generalizes to any consistent formal theory that can "do enough arithmetic" (and which satisfies another condition which doesn't matter here). Hence Gödel's incompleteness theorem (about theories containing enough arithmetic).
Two different Gödelian results about different notions (so, there's no tension between them!).
Best Answer
Logic dates back to Aristotle (at least). Set theory was not formalized in any sense (so far as I know) until centuries (millennia?) later. (Also, you can't actually tag Asaf in a question.)